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DATA TRANSFERS BETWEEN THE EU AND UK POST BREXIT? 
Andrew D. Murray, Law Department, LSE 
 
Original Article 
Summary 
 Changes to the UK constitutional and institutional settlement on Brexit 
day may affect the likelihood of the UK securing an adequacy decision 
under GDPR. 
 Despite the UK Government claiming that on Brexit day, “it will have fully 
implemented EU [data] privacy rules” it will have no equivalent of Article 
8 of the EU Charter in domestic law.  
 This may undermine efforts to achieve an adequacy ruling due to the 
decision of the CJEU in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner. 
 The UK’s decision to continue with a data retention regime in Part 4 of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 could also be at odds with the Article 8, 
Charter right.  
 Conflict between the domestic legal settlement of the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 and the decision of the CJEU in Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-
och telestyrelsen may also imperil an adequacy decision.  
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I: INTRODUCTION: THE UK GOVERNMENT’S POSITION 
On 1 February 2017, Matt Hancock, Minister of State for Digital and Culture, and 
part of the UK Government team responsible for policy in relation to data 
protection, as well as implementation of the GDPR, appeared before the EU 
Home Affairs Sub-Committee. The Committee were keen to hear from the 
Minister the Government’s plans to ensure the continued flow of data from the 
European Union to the UK after Brexit. Confirming that the UK Government 
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intended to implement the GDPR fully, and that they would not seek to make any 
significant changes to UK data protection law post Brexit, he noted that the 
Government was “keen to secure the unhindered flow of data between the UK 
and the EU post-Brexit and we think that signing up to the GDPR data protection 
rules is an important part of helping to deliver that”.1 While the Minister was 
keen to stress the UK Government would seek to ensure the unhindered 
exchange of data within an appropriate data protection environment he would 
not be drawn on whether the UK Government believed an adequacy decision 
would be necessary before “Brexit Day” on 29 March 2019 (assuming no 
extensions to negotiations) and refused to be drawn on the processes while 
negotiations were on-going. When directly asked the question “If you do not 
secure an adequacy decision what is the default position?” the Minister 
responded rather blandly “we are seeking unhindered data flows, and that we 
are confident we will achieve.”2  
 
In a later appearance before the same Sub-Committee, Baroness Williams, 
Minister of State at the Home Office placed on the record “the importance that 
the Government places on Data Protection and [their] commitment to ensuring 
robust safeguards are in place.”3 She argued that “the U.K. will enjoy a unique 
position as a third country seeking data transfers with the EU, given that, unlike 
                                                        
1 The Rt. Hon Matt Hancock, evidence to the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, 1 February 2017: 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/b3334d4c-93bf-4aca-9df5-666b7a72c06c (at 
10:49:32 - 10:49:53). 
2 Ibid, 11:02:35 – 11:03:03. 
3 Baroness Williams of Trafford, evidence to the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, 26 April 2017: 
http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/ed6b1fe1-c786-4768-9e63-a65b994cc8d7 (at: 11:02:50 - 
11:03:07) 
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other non-EU countries, it will have fully implemented EU [data] privacy rules.”4 
Like her colleague Mr Hancock though she refused to be drawn on the details of 
any post-Brexit settlement.  
 
It is clear therefore that the position of the UK Government is that the UK will 
continue to trade data with EU27 states following Brexit and that this should be 
“unhindered”. It also appears to be the view of the Government that to achieve a 
settlement to allow this to happen will be quite uncontentious given that in the 
words of Baroness Williams, “obviously on the day that we leave our laws are 
compatible with those of the EU”,5 however this paper will argue that this is not 
as clear-cut as Government Ministers seem to be assuming. The morning we 
leave the European Union a number of institutional and constitutional 
differences will be in place. Baroness Janke, in a question to Mr. Hancock, alluded 
to at least one of those differences: “If we will no longer be under the Jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Justice, how do you anticipate who will be the [] final 
adjudicator in such matters?”6 This is a significant question given Recital 41 of 
the GDPR: 
[w]here this Regulation refers to a legal basis or a legislative measure, 
this does not necessarily require a legislative act adopted by a 
parliament, without prejudice to requirements pursuant to the 
constitutional order of the Member State concerned. However, such a 
legal basis or legislative measure should be clear and precise and its 
application should be foreseeable to persons subject to it, in accordance 
                                                        
4 Ibid, 11:08:17 – 11:08:24. 
5 Ibid, 11:10:29 – 11:10:36. 
6 Above n.1, 10:40:30 – 10:40:58. 
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with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 
‘Court of Justice’) and the European Court of Human Rights.7  
The significance of Recital 41 should not be under-estimated for reasons we shall 
see below. The response from Mr. Hancock was in light of this less than 
encouraging: “there are several different ways that that can take place but [] we 
don’t have the answer to that question.”8 
 
II: BREXIT AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION 
Brexit will have legal implications far beyond the sphere of data protection and 
while data protection and data transference may be described as a “high 
priority” by Minsters9 it must compete for attention alongside other “high 
priorities” such as immigration controls; a common travel area with Ireland; 
investment in science and innovation; and a common approach to fighting crime 
and terrorism. All of these were listed as being among the government’s twelve 
priorities for Brexit in the Prime Minister’s speech of 17 January 2017, which 
pointedly did not list data protection and data transference among her 
priorities.10 This may explain the apparent approach of the Government: to 
serendipitously continue to apply in domestic law the GDPR and related 
Directives that will have come into effect on or by 25 May 2018 in full; to ensure 
in their words “an uninterrupted and unhindered” flow of data between the UK 
                                                        
7 Emphasis added. 
8 Above n.1, 10:40:58 – 10:41:06.  
9 Statement of Matt Hancock to the House of Lords European Union Committee as recorded at 
para.143 in Brexit: the EU data protection package, 3rd Report of Session 2017–18. Available 
from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/7/7.pdf. 
10 The Rt. Hon Theresa May MP, The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU, 17 
January 2017. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-
negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.   
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and EU27 post Brexit. However, as Baroness Janke explored, much of the 
constitutional and institutional landscape will be very different on 29 March 
2019. The EU institutions will be outwith the UK’s legal and constitutional 
framework and thus institutions such as the Commission and the Court of Justice 
will have no direct authority. The UK will also no longer be a member of the new 
European Data Protection Board (EDPB), for the Board is “composed of the head 
of one supervisory authority of each Member State and of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, or their respective representatives.”11  
 
The EDPB is considerably more powerful than the Article 29 Working Party with 
expanded roles and influence. The EDPB shall be an EU body12 and will have 
specific legal authority to act independently.13 The EDPB will be tasked with 
ensuring consistency of GDPR application throughout the EU and will issue 
guidelines and opinions to supervisory authorities when certain measures are 
adopted.14 A key role of the EDPB will be to issue binding decisions where 
conflicts arise between supervisory authorities, giving the EDPB a quasi-judicial 
function.15 Further, and crucially for the UK, the EDPB under is tasked with 
“provid[ing] the Commission with an opinion for the assessment of the adequacy 
of the level of protection in a third country, including for the assessment whether 
a third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third 
country, or an international organisation no longer ensures an adequate level of 
                                                        
11 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Art.68(3), OJ 2016 
L 119/1.  
12 Ibid, Art.68(1).   
13 Ibid, Art.69(1).   
14 Ibid, Arts.64 & 70. 
15 Ibid,  Art.65. 
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protection.”16 Thus the EDPB will advise the Commission of the UK’s adequacy 
under the GDPR but more importantly will continue to monitor the UK’s 
compliance. This suggests that should the UK fail to accept any decision of the 
EDPB; it may lose its adequacy status. This means the UK will have to accept 
decisions of the EDPB without representation on the Board, a position likely to 
be quite unpalatable to those who view Brexit as a complete divorce from EU 
institutions.  
 
The UK’s rights framework will also change for, as the UK Government White 
Paper on the Great Repeal Bill states:  
The Charter (of Fundamental Rights) only applies to member states 
when acting within the scope of EU law, so its relevance is removed by 
our withdrawal from the EU…It cannot be right that the Charter could be 
used to bring challenges against the Government, or for UK legislation 
after our withdrawal to be struck down on the basis of the Charter. On 
that basis the Charter will not be converted into UK law by the Great 
Repeal Bill.”17  
The White Paper suggests that withdrawal from the EU Charter will cause no 
change to the established rights framework of the UK:  
The Government’s intention is that the removal of the Charter from UK 
law will not affect the substantive rights that individuals already 
benefit from in the UK. Many of these underlying rights exist elsewhere 
in the body of EU law which we will be converting into UK law. Others 
                                                        
16 Ibid, Art.70(1)(s). 
17 Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal 
from the European Union, Cm 9446, March 2017: [2.23] (emphasis added). 
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already exist in UK law, or in international agreements to which the UK is 
a party. As EU law is converted into UK law by the Great Repeal Bill, it 
will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent 
with those underlying rights. Insofar as cases have been decided by 
reference to those underlying rights, that case law will continue to be 
relevant. In addition, insofar as such cases refer to the Charter, that 
element will have to be read as referring only to the underlying rights, 
rather than to the Charter itself.18  
 
One specific right, which is not to be found in UK law, or in other international 
agreements, is Article 8 of the EU Charter:19 the Data Protection Right. Clearly 
the UK Government will point to their intention to implement the GDPR as 
evidence that data protection rights are included in that body of “underlying 
rights [which] exist elsewhere in the body of EU law which we will be converting 
into UK law.”20 However it may be argued that there is a difference between the 
fundamental right to data protection found in the Article 8, and the provisions of 
the GDPR which provides a framework for the recognition and enforcement of 
the fundamental right. This right/framework distinction is acknowledged within 
the GDPR at Article 1(2) where it acknowledges “[t]his Regulation protects 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right 
to the protection of personal data.” The distinction between the roles of the 
Charter right and the GDPR is fine but important. The Charter (which holds 
                                                        
18 Ibid, [2.25] (emphasis added). 
19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, OJ 2012 C 326/391.  
20 See also Cl.3(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19: ‘Direct EU legislation, so far 
as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic law on and after exit day.’ 
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treaty equivalence)21 affords the right to data protection; the GDPR, which does 
not have treaty equivalence, is the framework to ensure this right is recognised 
and protected. Therefore it can clearly be argued that when the UK leaves the EU, 
and thereby the EU Charter, UK citizens (and EU citizens looking to enforce in the 
UK) will lose their right to data protection as found in Article 8 of the Charter. 
They will retain only the shadow of the right through the framework for data 
protection which will be found in the UK implementation of the GDPR. This 
essential distinction has a number of immediate implications. A domestic UK 
Data Protection Act cannot adequately replace the fundamental right to data 
protection found in the EU Charter. Such an Act, which is always subject to 
Parliamentary repeal, will only replicate the framework of data protection as 
found in the subordinate EU Legislation (the GDPR). Only if the UK Government 
were to adopt a right to data protection in some form in the proposed British Bill 
of Rights would there be true equivalence for Article 8 in domestic law. It may be 
argued that other UK international obligations such as Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data and its additional protocol22 or the OECD Privacy Framework23 
could substitute for Article 8, but importantly for this analysis these 
international legal instruments do not hold the same constitutional status as the 
EU Charter both requiring domestic implementation.  
 
                                                        
21 Art.6(1), Treaty on European Union 2012/C 326/01, OJ 2012 C 326/3. 
22 CETS 108, 28 January 1981 and ETS 181 8 November 2001. 
23 http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 
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This all becomes important when rights are thrown into conflict and domestic 
UK courts will become the final arbiter of data protection law in the UK.24  As 
Advocate General Jääskinen demonstrated in Google Spain SL and another v 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and another,25 there is a clear legal 
distinction between the Charter Right and the Directive (or Regulation) which 
gives effect to them.  
According to the ECHR and the Charter any interference to protected 
rights must be based on law and be necessary in a democratic society. In 
the present case we are not faced with interference by public authorities 
in need of justification but of the question of the extent that interference 
by private subjects can be tolerated. The limits to this are set out in the 
Directive, and they are thus based on law, as required by the ECHR and 
the Charter. Hence, when the Directive is interpreted, the exercise 
precisely concerns the interpretation of the limits set to data 
processing by private subjects in light of the Charter.26  
 
As will be argued below, this matters. There will no longer be a fundamental 
right to data protection in the UK post Brexit and this is something which cannot 
be remedied through domestic legal settlements short of a British Bill of Rights, 
and even then perhaps not so if Parliament retains sovereignty to amend or 
repeal these rights by normal Parliamentary procedures.  This implies that EU27 
citizens residing in the UK will not be able to rely on their Charter right whereas 
                                                        
24 In this paper, as in the Government White Paper, a UK Court, or UK Courts, should be 
interpreted as a Court or Courts of the constituent jurisdictions of the UK - i.e. England & Wales, 
Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
25 Case C‑131/12, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424 (AG Opinion) and 13 May 2014 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (Judgement) both reported at [2014] 3 CMLR 50.  
26 Ibid, [AG119] emphasis added. 
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EU27 citizens in EU27 member states will be able to so do.  This is more than a 
semantic difference as the UK seemingly seeks a hard Brexit beyond the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ and quite possible the EFTA Court. 
 
 
It may be argued that this is moot due to the line of authority that may be drawn 
from S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom.27  As was famously held in that case  
The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual 
amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8. The 
subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding. 
However, in determining whether the personal information retained by 
the authorities involves any of the private-life aspects mentioned above, 
the Court will have due regard to the specific context in which the 
information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of the 
records, the way in which these records are used and processed and the 
results that may be obtained. 
This line of authority also encompasses LH v. Latvia,28 Uzun v. Germany,29 and 
earlier cases such as X v Germany.30 This extensive definition of right to a private 
life clearly covers data privacy. Thus in Marper the data in question were entries 
on the police database of a database of fingerprints, cell samples and DNA 
profiles. In LH the data were personal medical data collected by the Inspectorate 
of Quality Control for Medical Care and Fitness for Work (“MADEKKI”). In Uzun 
                                                        
27 [2008] ECHR 1581. 
28 [2014] ECHR 515. 
29 [2011] 53 EHRR 24. 
30 (8334/78) May 7, 1981. Available from: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng - 
{"appno":["8334/78"]} 
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the data were gathered GPS data while in X the data were documents which had 
been photocopied in the applicant’s office. Clearly this line of authority suggests 
that the UK’s failure to implement Article 8 of the EU Charter is less significant 
given the expansive interpretation the ECtHR has given to Article 8 of the ECHR 
for as long as the UK remains a member of the ECHR.  
 
However there are key differences between Article 8 of the EU Charter and 
Article 8 of the ECHR. By Article 8 of the EU Charter not only does the data 
subject retain the right to protection of personal data concerning him or her, 
they also are given a number of subsidiary rights which are not clearly given in 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Thus by Article 8 of the ECHR the only guarantees given to 
the data subject are that:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
This is very limiting for it is only interference by a public authority that engages 
the convention right.31 The answer would appear to be the principle of 
horizontality, but as a number of authors, including Phillipson, have noted in 
determining horizontality: “the issue appears to have been placed firmly in the 
                                                        
31 The author is acutely aware of significant commentary and case-law on the Horizontal Effect of 
the ECHR in UK law including Gavin Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and 
the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper?’ (1999) 62 MLR 824 and Ian Loveland, ‘Horizontality of 
Art 8 in the context of possession proceedings’ (2015) European Human Rights Law Review 138. 
There is insufficient space here to discuss horizontality in full.  
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keeping of the courts”,32 and recently in an Article 8 application in McDonald v 
McDonald33 the Court of Appeal ruled that Art 8 does not have horizontal effect 
in the context of possession proceedings. This means that it is not clearly settled 
that the expansive definition of Article 8 ECHR would apply horizontally between 
private citizens in the UK legal systems. By comparison Article 8 of the EU 
Charter does have horizontal effect as afforded clearly by Article 8(2), and as 
recognised recently by the Court of Appeal in Vidal-Hall v. Google Inc.34 Further 
Article 8 of the Charter gives two additional rights, the right to data access and 
rectification and the right to have reference to a supervisory authority.  At risk of 
labouring the point, these rights will not be retained as rights post Brexit. The 
UK’s data protection regime may be compliant but the right to data access and 
rectification and the right to have reference to a supervisory authority will be 
lost. Also lost will be the guarantee of horizontal effect and recognition. The 
existence of the expansive interpretation of Article 8 ECHR found in Marper and 
other cases is not a solution to this problem.  
 
Despite the UK’s continuing commitment, at least in the short term, to the ECHR 
it can therefore clearly be argued that a UK court will still not have the a direct 
correspondent to Article 8 of the EU Charter in retained UK domestic law against 
which a court may interpret challenges to UK data protection law.35 This is a 
                                                        
32 Phillipson, ibid, 849. 
33 [2014] EWCA Civ 1049. 
34 [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
35 See further cl.6(3) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19: ‘Any question as to the 
validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided, so far as that law is unmodified 
on or after exit day and so far as  they are relevant to it— (a) in accordance with any retained 
case law and any retained general principles of EU law.’ (emphasis added).  
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position that may prove a happy resolution to some in the UK. As Mostyn J 
observed in the case of AB:36 
The claimant here asserts a violation of article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This right to protection of 
personal data is not part of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
and has therefore not been incorporated into our domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act. But by virtue of the decision of the court in 
Luxembourg, and notwithstanding the terms of the opt-out, the claimant 
is entitled, as Mr Westgate QC correctly says, surprising though it may 
seem, to assert a violation of it in these domestic proceedings before 
me.37 
Against this backdrop, it almost seems an understatement to say, as Orla Lynskey 
does, “the Charter has been accepted in the UK legal order only with great 
reluctance”.38 This point was taken up by Marina Wheeler QC who noted that 
“anxious that the Charter should not be used to overturn national law, the (then 
Labour) government negotiated what they believed to be an opt out of the 
Charter by means of Protocol No 30”39 but that by 2013, and the AB decision, the 
position had been reversed such that as observed by Mostyn J “that much wider 
Charter of Rights would remain part of our domestic law even if the Human 
Rights Act were repealed”.40 
 
                                                        
36 AB, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3453. 
37 Ibid, [16].  
38 Orla Lynskey, ‘Courts, privacy and data protection in the UK: Why two wrongs don’t make a 
right’ in M. Brkan and E. Psychogiopou (eds.), Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital 
Environment, 2017, 215, 229.  
39 Marina Wheeler, ‘Cavalier with our Constitution: a Charter too far’, UK Human Rights Blog, 9 
February 2016: https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2016/02/09/cavalier-with-our-constitution-a-
charter-too-far/ (visited 22 May 2017). 
40 Above n.36, [14].  
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Ironically of course Brexit reverses this position and the UK finds itself divorced 
from the Charter but not from the ECHR. The importance of the Charter in UK 
Law as a source of fundamental rights, including the Article 8 right, may be seen 
in a number of cases including Vidal Hall v Google41 and Viagogo.42 This vital 
source of the fundamental data protection right is likely to be lost if the 
judgement in AB is to be followed. We could end up in a zero-sum game where as 
far as the UK Government is concerned the equivalent of Article 8 is to be found 
in the UK implementing legislation giving effect to the GDPR, but where there is 
no Charter right with which to interpret obligations under the UK Legislation. 
The EU27 may see that as a failure to implement broadly equivalent protections 
for EU citizens.43   
 
Further, a vitally important take-away from the Google Spain case is that 
interpretation of enabling frameworks within Charter rights may even extend 
our understanding of the enabling provisions. Advocate General Jääskinen 
believed that “[Article 8] being a restatement of the EU and Council of Europe 
acquis in this field, emphasises the importance of protection of personal data, but 
it does not as such add any significant new elements to the interpretation of the 
Directive”44 leading him to conclude that “The rights to erasure and blocking of 
data, provided for in Art.12(b) , and the right to object, provided for in Art.14(a), 
of Directive 95/46 , do not confer on the data subject a right to address himself 
                                                        
41 Above n.34. 
42 The Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012] UKSC 55. 
43 At this point it may be further noted that even if one were to accept the expansive 
interpretation of Art.8 ECHR as being equivalent to Art.8 of the Charter there would be less 
strong enforceability and a less effective remedy available under the ECHR than under the 
Charter. 
44 Above n.25, [AG113]. 
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to a search engine service provider in order to prevent indexing of the 
information relating to him”.45 The Court though disagreed:  
The data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Arts 7 
and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer 
be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such 
a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic 
interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the 
general public in having access to that information upon a search relating 
to the data subject’s name.46  
 
The essential difference in Advocate General Jääskinen’s approach and that of 
the Court is the Court’s willingness to interpret the Directive expansively in light 
of Charter rights, including Article 8, which they see as overriding. A UK court 
post-Brexit (assuming there is to be no “right” to data protection implemented 
elsewhere) would be unable to do so. This returns us to Baroness Janke’s 
question and Recital 41. It will in all likelihood be impossible for a domestic UK 
court to interpret “a legal basis or a legislative measure…in accordance with the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) and 
the European Court of Human Rights” where the fundamental Right to Data 
Protection found in Article 8 is in question for there will be no domestic 
equivalent. This appears to be the case due to the current wording of cl.6(3)(a) of 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (subject to amendment). There it states 
that in interpreting retained EU Law any court or tribunal must decide the 
                                                        
45 Ibid, [AG138(3)]. 
46 Ibid, [99].  
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validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law “so far as that law is 
unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are relevant to it in accordance 
with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law” 
(emphasis added). As, as has been previously argued, there will be no retention 
of Article 8 of the EU Charter they will not be able to refer to Article 8 as it is not 
a “retained general principle of EU law.”  
III: GDPR AND ADEQUACY  
The UK Government seems to be of the opinion that as part of the Article 50 
negotiations the EU27 will recognise the UK implementation of the GDPR (and 
related provisions including the Law Enforcement Directive47) as being suitable 
for an adequacy decision under Article 45 GDPR or some form of equivalent 
measure adopted as part of a bilateral treaty or agreement negotiated as part of 
the Article 50 process. As noted above the Government is quite coy on how this 
might be achieved with the Minister of State for Digital and Culture refusing to be 
drawn on whether an adequacy decision was necessary. This seems to suggest 
the UK will seek to negotiate this as part of the Article 50 settlement.  
 
While we are somewhat in uncharted waters with the Article 50 process which 
rather baldly states “the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with 
that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union”, what is clear though is 
that the EU27 cannot agree to anything which would be against EU Law as part 
                                                        
47 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ 2016 L 119/89.  
 17 
of the Article 50 settlement with the UK. The agreement itself, as a new 
International Treaty enacted by the EU Institutions, would be subject to a 
possible legality challenge before the ECJ in so far as the EU Institutions cannot 
act in a way that breaches primary law, including the Charter.48 This position has 
recently been confirmed by the CJEU in the Opinion 1/15 judgement.49 This 
judgment is instructive in several ways to this analysis. Firstly it confirms that in 
place of an adequacy decision the European Union may enter into an 
international agreement with a third country which allows for the exportation of 
data to that third country.50 However, and vital to the current analysis, the Court 
found that any independently negotiated agreement (as under Article 50) must 
meet the same adequacy standards as Article 45 agreements.51 Perhaps equally 
as importantly the Court reminded us that where data is transferred to a third 
country, whether under an Article 45 adequacy ruling or under an independently 
negotiated agreement the third country must also take steps to prevent 
exportation of that data to countries which fail to provide EU level protection to 
personal data.52  
 
                                                        
48 Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission 3 September 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I–6351. 
49 Opinion procedure 1/15, Request for an Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, made on 
30 January 2015 by the European Parliament, 26 July2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:592.  
50 At [214] the Court concludes that “disclosure requires the existence of either an agreement 
between the European Union and the non-member country concerned equivalent to that 
agreement, or a decision of the Commission, under Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46, finding that 
the third country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of EU law and 
covering the authorities to which it is intended PNR data be transferred.”   
51 Ibid, [67]. Further at [214] the Court notes that “a transfer of personal data from the European 
Union to a non-member country may take place only if that country ensures a level of protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the 
European Union.” 
52 Ibid, [134], [214].  
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Legally post Brexit the UK will be classified as a “third country” in GDPR terms, 
whether or not an agreement for data transfers is negotiated as an adequacy 
decision or as an independent agreement as part of the Article 50 negotiations. 
The impact of this is that any agreement, whether negotiated as part of the 
Article 50 settlement or separately must according to the decisions in both Kadi 
and Opinion 1/15 meet existing EU legal standards and frameworks. This means 
that any agreement entered into by the UK Government and the EU27 member 
states will need to comply with Chapter V/Article 44 of the GDPR.  
 
Assuming the UK will not be an EEA state, a position held by the UK 
Government,53 then transfers to the UK from the EEA post-Brexit will need to be 
authorised by one of the suite of available GDPR options. The most likely 
outcome is an Article 50 treaty or settlement agreed under the same legal 
framework as the GDPR. Alternatives include a stand-alone adequacy ruling 
under Article 45, or that transfers be permitted subject to safeguards under 
Article 46, or be made subject to Binding Corporate Rules under Article 47. 
These seem to be the only options, as derogations under Article 49 could not 
apply in all cases. Of the remaining GDPR-compliant provisions (remembering 
that applying the decisions of the Court in Kadi and Opinion 1/15 agreements 
made as part of the Article 50 negotiations would need to be GDPR compliant)54 
we find that Article 47 does not create a blanket right for “the unhindered flow of 
data between the UK and the EU” that the UK Government is seeking so it seems 
                                                        
53 A UK Government Spokesperson is recorded as saying “The UK is party to the EEA agreement 
only in its capacity as an EU member state. Once the UK leaves the EU, the EEA agreement will 
automatically cease to apply to the UK” in L. Hughes and J. Eysenck ‘What is the new article 127 
Brexit challenge – and what does it mean?’ Daily Telegraph 2 February 2017: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/article-127-new-brexit-legal-challenge-single-market/  
54 Above n.48 and n.51. 
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it can be discounted. This leaves two options “transfers subject to appropriate 
safeguards” under Article 46 or “transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision” 
under Article 45. 
 
If the UK believes that an adequacy decision may not be required then this may 
suggest that the Government believes that transfers may take place under some 
form of master agreement under Article 46. This provides that “a controller or 
processor may transfer personal data to a third country or an international 
organisation only if the controller or processor has provided appropriate 
safeguards, and on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective 
legal remedies for data subjects are available.” A safeguards settlement though 
could not possibly be negotiated during Article 50 negotiations as the 
undertaking must be given by the controller or processor and cannot be given by 
the supervisory authority. Although supervisory authorities may authorise 
standard data protection clauses or approved codes of conduct, agreement 
would have to be reached individually with data controllers or processors. This 
means Article 46 cannot be employed to achieve the Government’s aims.  
 
We are therefore by process of elimination left with Article 45 either as a stand-
alone adequacy decision, or some form of equivalent adequacy settlement 
independently negotiated under the Article 50 process. The UK Government 
seems though unwilling to acknowledge this publicly. From the current mood in 
Westminster it may be assumed that the Government is seeking to put in place 
an adequacy-equivalent decision as part of the Article 50 negotiations. In fact it 
may be argued that this position has been publicly acknowledged in the Article 
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50 letter itself. There the Prime Minister wrote: “leading in the world, and 
defending itself from security threats … We therefore believe it is necessary to 
agree the terms of our future partnership alongside those of our withdrawal 
from the European Union.”55 This is clearly a (not very) veiled reference to the 
UK’s excellence in signals intelligence (SIGINT) data gathering and the need to 
share data for law enforcement purposes, a point she returned to later in the 
letter saying, “in security terms a failure to reach agreement would mean our 
cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism would be weakened.”56  It 
seems a data sharing agreement, which one imagines would include an adequacy 
decision, is explicitly going to be part of the Article 50 negotiations. As a result it 
may be concluded that the UK is seeking to enter into an independent agreement 
with the EU27 member states to allow for the free flow of data post Brexit. Such 
agreement will be required to be in compliance with Article 45 principles for the 
reasons set out in Opinion 1/15.  
 
What will a UK adequacy-standard agreement look like though? At first glance it 
would seem pretty straightforward, for as Baroness Williams suggests, “on the 
day that we leave our laws are compatible with those of the EU”,57 however as 
we have seen subsequently this is not the case both institutionally and 
constitutionally. The CJEU will no longer have authority over the domestic UK 
legal settlement, the EU Charter, and in particular Article 8, will have no direct 
equivalent in UK law and the 105 references to the Commission will have been 
                                                        
55 Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Pri
me_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf  
56 Ibid. 
57 Above, n.5. 
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excised from (or will be meaningless in) the UK legislation giving effect to GDPR, 
and the UK will be withdrawn from the European Data Protection Board. In short 
it is far from as simple as Baroness Williams suggests.   
 
Happily the UK’s implementation of GDPR and related Directives will ensure that 
the UK will meet most, if not all, Article 45 requirements on day one. It will 
possess clearly an effective supervisory authority in the form of the Information 
Commissioner’s Office, which will have equivalent powers and responsibilities to 
other EU27/EEA supervisory authorities. It will have similar international 
commitments to its EU27/EEA partners and will still, at least at the outset, be 
party to the ECHR; the leading regional system for the protection of privacy 
aspects of personal data. The UK will possess the necessary legal framework for 
the recognition of the rights of data subjects and will have an effective and 
functioning system for effective and enforceable administrative and judicial 
redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being transferred. When 
one compares for example the position of the UK on 29 March 2019 with the 
position of a number of countries which have adequacy decisions such as 
Switzerland, Uruguay or the Privacy Shield agreement with the federal 
government of the United States it is clear the UK will have a much more 
comprehensive and compliant data protection regime. The UK should therefore 
qualify immediately for an adequacy-standard agreement. However there is one 
UK legal provision which may prove problematic both in the short-term and in 
the longer term.  
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IV: THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2016 
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is a comprehensive restatement of UK 
security and intelligence laws. It covers a variety of law enforcement and 
investigatory techniques employed by the police and by the security and 
intelligence services from interception of communications to equipment 
interference and covers a wide range of targeted and bulk warrants.  
 
For the purposes of this paper we will focus on Part 4: Retention of 
Communications Data. This part of the Act permits data retention orders to be 
issued, replacing the provisions of the now repealed Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA).  The effective power is found in s.87(1). 
This permits the “Secretary of State [to] require a telecommunications operator 
to retain relevant communications data if (a) the Secretary of State considers 
that the requirement is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the 
purposes falling within paragraphs (a) to (j) of section 61(7) (purposes for which 
communications data may be obtained), and (b) the decision to give the notice 
has been approved by a Judicial Commissioner.” The key difference between 
s.87(1) and s.1(1) of DRIPA is the addition of sub-section (b): oversight by a 
Judicial Commissioner. The list of permitted purposes found in s.61(7) is at first 
glance wider than that permitted under DRIPA. New permitted purposes include: 
(a) to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice; (b) to assist in the 
identification of a person or their next of kin and (c) functions relating to the 
regulation of financial services and markets, or financial stability. Some purposes 
have been removed or narrowed, offsetting some of the new purposes. Thus the 
previously permitted purpose of “in the interests of the economic well-being of 
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the United Kingdom” has been narrowed by the addition of qualifying text “so far 
as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security” while a 
general law-making power “for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to 
(g)) which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by 
the Secretary of State” is removed. This final amendment, alongside the role of 
the Judicial Commissioners may assist the UK Government in securing an 
adequacy decision, although as we shall see this is far from certain.  
 
Significant new safeguards have been added. By s.88 the Secretary of State must 
take a reflective overview of the need to issue a retention notice before it is 
issued taking into account (among others): the likely benefits of the notice, the 
likely number of users (if known) of any telecommunications service to which 
the notice relates, the technical feasibility of complying with the notice, and the 
likely cost of complying with the notice. Further by s.88(2) the Secretary of State 
must, before giving such a notice, take reasonable steps to consult any operator 
to whom it relates. The second additional safeguard is the addition of the review 
of the Judicial Commissioners. The role of the Judicial Commissioners is new and 
may be found in s.227. This creates the new positions of the Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner and other Judicial Commissioners. The Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner is the chief Judicial Commissioner and must have held 
high judicial office (as must the other Judicial Commissioners). Lord Justice 
Fulford, Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales, has been appointed as the 
first Investigatory Powers Commissioner.58 The Judicial Commissioners are 
                                                        
58 Her Majesty’s Government, Press Release Investigatory Powers Commissioner Appointed: Lord 
Justice Fulford, 3 March 2017. Available from: 
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charged under s.89(1) to “review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to 
whether the requirement to be imposed by the notice to retain relevant 
communications data is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the 
purposes falling within paragraphs (a) to (j) of section 61(7).” However the way 
they are to do this is rather unusual. By s.89(2)(a) they are directed to “apply the 
same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial 
review” while by s.89(2)(b) they are required to “consider the matters referred 
to in subsection (1) with a sufficient degree of care as to ensure that the Judicial 
Commissioner complies with the duties imposed by section 2 (general duties in 
relation to privacy).”  
 
These two provisions seem to be in conflict. The duties imposed by section 2 ask 
the Commissioners to weigh: (a) whether what is sought to be achieved by the 
warrant, authorisation or notice could reasonably be achieved by other less 
intrusive means; (b) whether the level of protection to be applied in relation to 
any obtaining of information by virtue of the warrant, authorisation or notice is 
higher because of the particular sensitivity of that information; (c) the public 
interest in the integrity and security of telecommunication systems and postal 
services; and (d) any other aspects of the public interest in the protection of 
privacy against (a) the interests of national security or of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom, and (b) the public interest in preventing or 
detecting serious crime. However this solemn weighting of privacy against the 
public interest is somewhat undermined by the s.89(2)(a) requirement that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/investigatory-powers-commissioner-appointed-lord-
justice-fulford    
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Judicial Commissioners “apply the same principles as would be applied by a 
court on an application for judicial review”.  
 
Judicial review principles are rather narrow and review the administrative 
process of the decision rather than the substance of the decision. This means 
commissioners will be restricted in the scope of their actions to the three Judicial 
Review grounds: (1) Illegality: conflict with legal order or ultra vires; (2) 
Fairness: a public body should never act so unfairly that it amounts to an abuse 
of power; and (3) Irrationality and proportionality: a decision may be considered 
so demonstrably unreasonable as to constitute ‘irrationality’ or ‘perversity’ on 
the part of the decision maker.   
 
Some have criticised the adoption of judicial review principles. Appearing before 
the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill Caroline Wilson 
Palow, General Counsel of Privacy International, argued that “the Judicial 
Commissioners need the full ability to assess the warrants when they come to 
them. It should not be just a judicial review standard. They need to assess fully 
the substance of the warrant and, among other things, whether there are other 
less obtrusive means by which this information could be obtained.”59 Shami 
Chakrabarti, then Director of Liberty, was more forceful. 
Judicial review does not help at all in this context. When you are 
deciding whether it is proportionate to issue a warrant for intrusive 
surveillance of an individual, let alone of a whole group of people, that 
                                                        
59 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, Oral evidence: Draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill, HC 651, Wednesday 9 December 2015: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/oral/25977.html  
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is a judgment made on the evidence. A judicial review test only second-
guesses the Secretary of State, in very limited circumstances. Did they 
make a bonkers decision that no reasonable Secretary of State could 
take?60  
Others take a more sympathetic view to the use of Judicial Review standards. 
Lord David Pannick QC in an article for The Times newspaper noted that “Andy 
Burnham and David Davis…say that a judicial review test gives judges too little 
power because it only relates to ‘process’. But it is well established that judicial 
review is a flexible concept, the rigour of which depends on the context. The 
Court of Appeal so stated in 2008 in the T-Mobile case.”61 He goes on to point out 
that Judges already apply Judicial Review standards successfully in a complex 
rights framework.  
[t]he closest analogy to the provisions in the draft bill is judicial review of 
control orders and Tpims (terrorist prevention and investigation 
measures). The Court of Appeal stated in the MB case in 2006 that judges 
applying a judicial review test must themselves consider the merits and 
decide whether the measure is indeed necessary and proportionate. It is 
true that the context there involves restrictions that vitally affect liberty 
— in the sense of freedom of movement. But I would expect the courts to 
apply a very similar approach in the present context, concerned as it is 
with the important issue of privacy. So those who are concerned that a 
                                                        
60 Ibid.  
61 David Pannick QC: ‘Safeguards provide a fair balance on surveillance powers’ The Times 12 
November 2015. The T-Mobile case refereed to is T-Mobile & Telefonica v Ofcom [2008] EWCA Civ 
1373.  
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judicial review test does not give judges sufficient control should be 
reassured.62 
 
Sir Stanley Burnton, then Interception of Communications Commissioner, and 
Lord Judge, then Chief Surveillance Commissioner, both endorsed the Pannick 
approach, however not without reservation. In their evidence to the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill Sir Stanley noted that “Judicial 
review is not simply a question of looking at process. [T]he commissioner has to 
look at necessity and proportionality. The degree to which judicial review is 
imposed as a test and the stringency of the test depend very much on the 
context, the facts of the individual case and the consequences of the 
administrative or governmental decision in question.”63 Lord Judge supported 
Sir Stanley’s position but added a hesitation.  
My only hesitation, which is a lawyerly one but not totally without some 
force, is in using the words ‘judicial review’ as a description of the test 
that has to be applied by the judicial officer. Judicial review used to be 
Wednesbury unreasonable mad. We would call it Wednesbury 
unreasonable, meaning only an idiot could have reached this decision. 
Nowadays, judicial review is less stringent than that: ‘He is not an idiot, 
but it is a really stupid decision’. That is not quite the same. ‘I am not sure 
many people would have reached this decision’ is another test. We need 
to be slightly careful. If you are talking about the Home Secretary…[t]he 
                                                        
62 Ibid.  
63 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, Oral evidence: Draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill, HC 651, Wednesday 2 December 2015: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill-committee/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/oral/25685.html  
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Home Secretary has the most amazing responsibilities in relation to that. 
Judges second guessing is simply inappropriate. You have to have a 
stringent judicial review test. I am now coming back to what Sir Stanley 
said. You know you are dealing with national security; you know 
somebody might be planting a bomb. You are going to be very cautious 
about interfering and saying, ‘This man or woman, who is the Secretary 
of State, is daft’.64  
 
Lord Judge’s hesitation raises a note of concern that may impact the UK’s ability 
to obtain an equivalency decision. The draft of the Bill being discussed in 
Committee on that date did not contain a provision equivalent to s.89(2)(b). 
Some may argue the addition of s.89(2)(b) will empower Judicial Commissioners 
to take the expansive Pannick view that will employ “a judicial review test 
[which] must [] consider the merits and decide whether the measure is indeed 
necessary and proportionate” however if as he says “judicial review is a flexible 
concept, the rigour of which depends on the context” then the risk is that when 
s.89(2)(a) and 89(2)(b) are placed in conflict Judicial Commissioners will follow 
the Judge line that warrants should only be refused when the Commissioner 
believes that “this man or woman, who is the Secretary of State, is daft.” This 
could have far reaching implications for the recognition of adequacy in UK data 
protection law post Brexit due to the line of authority of Digital Rights Ireland Ltd 
v Minister for Communications, 65  Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner66 and Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen.67 
                                                        
64 Ibid. 
65 Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, 8 April 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
66 Case C-362/14, 6 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.  
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V: DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND LTD v. MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS68 
 
The Digital Rights Ireland case was, of course, was the famous challenge to the 
now repealed Data Retention Directive.69 While the long-term legal impact of the 
case is reduced due to the fact that it was a specific challenge to the Directive’s 
legality there are still a number of important take-aways for a post-Brexit data 
protection environment.  
 
While much of the detail of the case turned upon the interplay between Article 
15(1) of the ePrivacy Directive,70 Article 13(1) of the Data Protection Directive71 
and the provisions of the Data Retention Directive,72 there were elements of 
interplay also with the EU Charter and the rights framework of the EU. Vitally the 
Court found  
The retention of data for the purpose of possible access to them by the 
competent national authorities, as provided for by Directive 2006/24, 
directly and specifically affects private life and, consequently, the rights 
guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter. Furthermore, such a retention of 
data also falls under Article 8 of the Charter because it constitutes the 
processing of personal data within the meaning of that article and, 
                                                                                                                                                              
67 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 21 December 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. 
68 Above n.65. 
69 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ 2006 L 105/54. 
70 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ 2002 L 201/37. 
71 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ 2005 L 281/31.  
72 Above, n.69.  
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therefore, necessarily has to satisfy the data protection requirements 
arising from that article.73  
This is important as it confirms that data retention processes engage Article 8 of 
the EU Charter and as we have seen above Article 8 is one of the provisions of the 
Charter not to have guaranteed recognition in the UK in the post-Brexit 
environment. Now, as we have already rehearsed, an argument may be made 
that by importing the GDPR framework into domestic UK law in full then the UK 
will have satisfied “the data protection requirements arising from that article”. 
However a contrary interpretation is that, again as we have seen, when the UK 
leaves the EU, UK citizens (and EU citizens looking to enforce in the UK) will lose 
their right to data protection as found in Article 8. They will, as set out above, 
retain only the shadow of the right through the framework for data protection 
found in the UK implementation of the GDPR.   
 
In Digital Rights Ireland the court found that “Directive 2006/24 constitutes an 
interference with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter because it provides for the processing of 
personal data.”74 This is an important development. The Court clearly states that 
data retention not only engages Article 8, it is also an interference with the 
fundamental right to data protection. The question then comes down to whether 
or not that interference is justified. After quickly finding that “the retention of 
data for the purpose of allowing the competent national authorities to have 
possible access to those data, as required by Directive 2006/24, genuinely 
                                                        
73 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, above n.65, [29] (emphasis added).  
74 Ibid, [36] (emphasis added).  
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satisfies an objective of general interest”75 that interest being “the fight against 
international terrorism in order to maintain international peace and security 
constitutes an objective of general interest and the fight against serious crime in 
order to ensure public security”76 the Court moved on to the question of 
proportionality.  
 
Here the Court found that “in view of the important role played by the protection 
of personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect for private life 
and the extent and seriousness of the interference with that right caused by 
Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature’s discretion is reduced, with the result that 
review of that discretion should be strict.”77 The Court further noted, “the 
protection of personal data resulting from the explicit obligation laid down in 
Article 8(1) of the Charter is especially important for the right to respect for 
private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.”78 As a result of this “the EU 
legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope 
and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards 
so that the persons whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to 
effectively protect their personal data against the risk of abuse and against any 
unlawful access and use of that data.”79 Finding that the Directive required all 
traffic data concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, 
Internet e-mail and Internet telephony to be retained the Court found the 
                                                        
75 Ibid, [44]. 
76 Ibid, [42]. 
77 Ibid, [48]. 
78 Ibid, [53]. 
79 Ibid, [54]. 
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Directive not to be a proportionate response to the threat and struck it down. In 
so doing the Court ruled:  
Directive 2006/24 does not provide for sufficient safeguards, as required 
by Article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective protection of the data 
retained against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and 
use of that data. In the first place, Article 7 of Directive 2006/24 does not 
lay down rules which are specific and adapted to (i) the vast quantity of 
data whose retention is required by that directive, (ii) the sensitive 
nature of that data and (iii) the risk of unlawful access to that data, rules 
which would serve, in particular, to govern the protection and security of 
the data in question in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure their 
full integrity and confidentiality.80 
 
The risk of this decision to the post-Brexit flow of data between the EU27/EEA 
and the UK is clear. The Investigatory Powers Act does not have these 
protections. Section 2, as implemented in data retention cases by s.89(2)(b), asks 
the  Judicial Commissioners to consider “whether what is sought to be achieved 
by the warrant, authorisation or notice could reasonably be achieved by other 
less intrusive means” and “whether the level of protection to be applied in 
relation to any obtaining of information by virtue of the warrant, authorisation 
or notice is higher because of the particular sensitivity of that information”. In 
addition by s.92 “a telecommunications operator who retains relevant 
communications data must (a) secure that the data is of the same integrity, and 
subject to at least the same security and protection, as the data on any system 
                                                        
80 Ibid, [66]. 
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from which it is derived, (b) secure, by appropriate technical and organisational 
measures, that the data can be accessed only by specially authorised personnel, 
and (c) protect, by appropriate technical and organisational measures, the data 
against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or 
unauthorised or unlawful retention, processing, access or disclosure.” The 
Government believes that collectively these represent implementation of data 
protection provisions for retained data. Essentially if the system was data 
protection compliant when the data were gathered then it will remain so under 
s.92(1)(a) while retained. However there are two problems with this. The first is 
that this appears to be far short of “govern[ing] the protection and security of the 
data in question in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure their full integrity 
and confidentiality.” The second is that it assumes the data retained were in a 
compliant system at the point it was retained. Currently this would be subject to 
a challenge that engages Article 8 of the EU Charter. Post-Brexit this will not be 
possible.  
 
VI: TELE2 SVERIGE AB v. POST-OCH TELESTYRELSEN 
Two UK MPs, David Davis MP (now ironically Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union) and Tom Watson MP brought a challenge to the UK’s 
subsequent domestic legislation, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 (DRIPA). The reference to the CJEU from the UK Court of Appeal was 
joined with a Swedish reference Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen.81 Davis 
and Watson (later just Watson as Davis’s appointment to the UK Cabinet placed 
                                                        
81 Above n.67. 
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him in conflict and he was required to drop out of the challenge) argued that the 
Digital Rights Ireland judgment laid down “mandatory requirements of EU law” 
applicable to the legislation of Member States on the retention of 
communications data and access to such data. This meant that the provisions of 
DRIPA, which broadly replicated the provisions of the Data Retention Directive 
(though subject to a “retention notice” issued under s.1(1) by the Secretary of 
State rather than as a blanket retention as the Directive had provided), were 
unlawful under EU law. The Divisional Court agreed finding that as the Data 
Retention Directive was incompatible with the principle of proportionality, 
national legislation containing the same provisions as that Directive could, 
equally, not be compatible with that principle.82 The Government appealed and 
the Court of Appeal took a different interpretation taking a provisional view that, 
in Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of Justice was not laying down specific 
mandatory requirements of EU law with which national legislation must comply, 
but was simply identifying and describing protections that were absent from the 
harmonised EU regime, while referring the case to the CJEU.83  
 
The Court of Appeal referred two questions to the CJEU: 
(1) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to lay down 
mandatory requirements of EU law with which the national legislation 
of Member States must comply? 
                                                        
82 R .v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ex parte Davis & Watson) [2015] EWHC 2092 
(Admin). 
83 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Davis and Ors. [2015] EWCA Civ 1185.  
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 (2) Did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to expand the effect of 
 Articles 7 and/or 8, EU Charter beyond the effect of Article 8 ECHR as 
 established in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR?84 
 
 When the cases were joined the CJEU slightly altered the approach to the 
questions but the key questions of whether the Digital Rights Ireland case laid 
requirements on member states, and what the correct approach to the 
application of Articles 7 and 8 were, remained.  
 
Like the Digital Rights Ireland case much of the discussion both in Advocate 
General Saugmandsgaard Øe’s and in the Court’s opinion turned on technical 
issues of the interplay of the EU legal framework. The key question here was 
whether the existence of the data retention provision found in Article 15(1) of 
the ePrivacy Directive precluded member states from making domestic 
legislation in this area without reference to Article 15(1). As such the argument 
of the claimants was that domestic legislation made under Article 15(1) would 
be bound by the principles of Digital Rights Ireland. This is a very interesting and 
important point but not directly relevant to this analysis so will not be pursued 
further here.85 
 
                                                        
84 Ibid, [118].  
85 Although not relevant to this analysis this point is very important for the Brexit position of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). If the IPT upholds this point they may find that the EU did 
not have competence to act in national security matters and post Brexit any EU provisions are 
inapplicable. This in itself is not an issue for an equivalence decision as Art.23(1)(a)of the GDPR 
allows for restrictions. This matter was discussed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Davis and Ors, above n.83, at [91] – [106].  
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Essential to our analysis here is the interplay between the domestic UK 
legislation and the UK’s responsibilities under the EU Charter. A key point raised 
by Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in relation to domestic regimes as 
opposed to a harmonised one, was: 
In accordance with Art.8(3) of the Charter, every Member State must 
ensure that an independent authority reviews compliance with the 
requirements of protection and security on the part of the service 
providers to which their national regimes apply. In the absence of 
coordination throughout the European Union, however, those national 
authorities might find it impossible to fulfil their supervisory duties in 
other Member States.86  
 
This is a question likely to be magnified post-Brexit when the UK leaves the EU 
Charter. In his analysis of whether the Swedish and UK provisions met the 
requirements of Arts 7 & 8 of the Charter Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe 
observed that an argument made by the UK Government that “a general data 
retention obligation may be justified by any of the objectives mentioned in either 
Art.15(1) of Directive 2002/58 or Art.13(1) of Directive 95/46. According to that 
such an obligation could be justified by the utility of retained data in combating 
‘ordinary’ (as opposed to ‘serious’) offences, or even in proceedings other than 
criminal proceedings, with regard to the objectives mentioned in those 
                                                        
86 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 19 July 2016 in Tele2 Sverige AB 
v Post-och telestyrelsen (C-203/15) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson 
(C-698/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:572 at [241].  
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provisions”87 was “not convincing”. He came to this conclusion for several 
reasons but prime among them was  
The requirement of proportionality within a democratic society prevents 
the combating of ordinary offences and the smooth conduct of 
proceedings other than criminal proceedings from constituting 
justifications for a general data retention obligation. The considerable 
risks that such obligations entail outweigh the benefits they offer in 
combating ordinary offences and in the conduct of proceedings other 
than criminal proceedings.88  
The CJEU in their judgement backed Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe’s 
interpretation finding that “the objective pursued by that legislation must be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the interference in fundamental rights that 
that access entails, it follows that, in the area of prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences, only the objective of fighting 
serious crime is capable of justifying such access to the retained data.”89 
 
This remains a problem for the UK Government. By s.87(1) of the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 the Secretary of State may issue a retention notice if the 
Secretary of State “considers that the requirement is necessary and 
proportionate for one or more of the purposes falling within paragraphs (a) to (j) 
of section 61(7)”. These purposes are: (a) the interests of national security; (b) 
preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; (c) the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the 
                                                        
87 Ibid, [169]. 
88 Ibid, [172]. 
89 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen (C-203/15) and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Tom Watson (C-698/15) above n.67 at [115] (emphasis added).  
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interests of national security; (d) in the interests of public safety; (e) for the 
purpose of protecting public health; (f) for assessing or collecting any tax, duty, 
levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government 
department; (g) for preventing death or injury or any damage to a person’s 
physical or mental health, or of mitigating any injury or damage to a person’s 
physical or mental health; (h) to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of 
justice; (i) where a person has died or is unable to identify themselves because of 
a physical or mental condition to assist in identifying them, or to obtain 
information about their next of kin or other persons connected with them; (j) for 
the purpose of exercising functions relating to the regulation of financial services 
and markets, or financial stability.  
 
Looking at this list only (a), (c) and (d) seem clearly to meet the standard the 
Court is thinking of. It is possible in certain circumstances that (b) (e) and (j) are 
compliant, but it is hard to think of cases where (f), (g), (h) and (i) would meet 
the high Tele2 standard. Most clearly heading (b) preventing or detecting crime 
or of preventing disorder does not meet the Tele2 standard of “only the objective 
of fighting serious crime is capable of justifying such access to the retained data”.  
 
Additionally the Investigatory Powers Act retains the wide scope of the DRIPA 
provision, what may be called a “general or indiscriminate” notice. By s.87(2)(a) 
– (c) a retention notice may “relate to a particular operator or any description of 
operators”, “require the retention of all data or any description of data”, and 
“identify the period or periods for which data is to be retained” (emphasis 
added). Collectively these provisions suggest notices which can apply to a 
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particular operator (or a number of operators), may be defined so as to retain all 
data that operator holds for an extended period. This fits the definition of a 
“general or indiscriminate” notice that the Court ruled to be incompatible with 
the Charter in Tele2.90 This suggests a fundamental difference in approach 
between the UK and the EU27 on this matter. 
 
It is not only the question of purposes which may affect the UK’s ability to obtain 
an adequacy decision post Tele2. The question of the UK’s supervisory 
arrangements for retention orders under Part 4 is also questionable. Tele2 
requires:  
Member States [to] ensure review, by an independent authority, of 
compliance with the level of protection guaranteed by EU law with 
respect to the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of 
personal data, that control being expressly required by Art.8(3) of the 
Charter and constituting, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, 
an essential element of respect for the protection of individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data. If that were not so, persons 
whose personal data was retained would be deprived of the right, 
guaranteed in Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter, to lodge with the 
national supervisory authorities a claim seeking the protection of their 
data.91  
The UK meets this in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 through s.244: “The 
Information Commissioner must audit compliance with requirements or 
                                                        
90 Ibid, [103], [112].  
91 Ibid, [123]. 
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restrictions imposed by virtue of Part 4 in relation to the integrity, security or 
destruction of data retained by virtue of that Part.” However it is certainly not 
clear that this simple audit role meets the requirement of Tele2 that “persons 
have a right, guaranteed in Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter, to lodge with the 
national supervisory authorities a claim seeking the protection of their data.” 
Individuals who wish to challenge the retention and storage of personal data 
under a data retention notice must do so through an application to the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal  (discussed further below). This may only be done 
in accordance with s.65 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This 
allows for two forms of challenge: a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 for 
any breach of fundamental rights; or a complaint against a public authority for 
using covert techniques. Although providing a remedy, and arguably as will be 
discussed below, one which is probably GDPR complaint, this is a judicial 
procedure and seems quite distinct from the role of national supervisory 
authorities as required by Tele2.  
 
In short there are a number of areas where the interaction of the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 and the decision in Tele2 may find themselves in conflict. These 
all potentially undermine the UK’s ability to receive an adequacy decision under 
Article 45 GDPR. 
VII: SCHREMS 
Inevitably when discussing the interplay between data transfers and adequacy 
decisions one finds themself faced with the Schrems decision.92 This was the 
                                                        
92 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, above n.66.  
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famous challenge to the Safe Harbor adequacy decision93 brought by Austrian 
student Max Schrems following the Snowden revelations. Mr. Schrems argued, 
ultimately successfully, that “that the law and practices of the United States offer 
no real protection of the data kept in the United States against State 
surveillance.”94  
 
The potential parallels between the Schrems challenge and the UK’s desire to 
have an adequacy ruling post-Brexit are clear. The UK, like the US, operates a 
massive state surveillance regime involving not only data retention as this paper 
has discussed at length, but also policies such as TEMPORA, the system used by 
GCHQ to buffer most Internet communications extracted from fibre-optic cables 
so these can be processed and searched at a later time. This programme is 
operated alongside commercial partners such as Vodafone and British 
Telecommunications making it not unlike the PRISM programme at the heart of 
the Schrems case.  
 
The key question is, given the previous discussion of the UK’s data retention 
programme, and the decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2, could Schrems 
deliver a potentially fatal blow to any attempts by the UK Government to secure 
a lasting adequacy ruling in the Article 50 negotiations?  
 
                                                        
93 European Commission Decision 2000/520 of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe 
harbor privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, OJ 2000 L215/7.  
94 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 23 September 2015, Case C-362/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:627 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [AG25].  
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The first thing to note is that by implementing the GDPR in full and given the pre-
existence of a supervisory authority in the form of the Information 
Commissioner’s Office the UK sidesteps the main complaint in Schrems: the UK 
has a functional and functioning out of court dispute resolution system operated 
by an independent third party. However the role of the Information 
Commissioner’s Office is limited in questions of national security.95 We can 
assume that in any domestic legislation giving effect to the GDPR the UK 
Government will seek to continue the exemption the security services currently 
enjoy through an implementation of the Article 23 GDPR restriction. Currently 
the UK is shielded from any implication of this restriction by the fact that it is an 
EU member state and subject to effective supervision via the CJEU with the full 
force of EU law, including the Charter, in place. When the UK leaves and goes it 
alone it loses this framework. The Commission in coming to an adequacy 
decision will be required to apply Schrems and this tells us that “legislation not 
providing for any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order 
to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or 
erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to 
effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Art.47 of the Charter.”96 In the 
Schrems case there was insufficient protection of Article 47 for in the words of 
Advocate General Bot “there is oversight on the part of the FISC, but the 
proceedings before it are secret and ex parte. I consider that that amounts to an 
interference with the right of citizens of the Union to an effective remedy, 
protected by Art.47 of the Charter.”97 
                                                        
95 See s.28 of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
96 Above, n.66, [95].  
97 Above, n.94, [173]. 
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Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 the only effective route to challenge any decision or action of 
the security services is the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The Tribunal is not 
unlike FISC in that by s.68 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 it 
may “determine their own procedure in relation to any proceedings, complaint 
or reference brought before or made to them”. In practice procedure is as stated 
on the Tribunal’s web site.  
We are the first court of our kind to establish ‘inter partes’ hearings in 
open court in the security field. These hearings allow us to hear 
arguments on both sides on the basis of ‘assumed facts’ without risk to 
our national security. This means that where there is a substantial issue 
of law to consider, and without at that stage taking a decision as to 
whether the allegation in a complaint is true, we invite the parties 
involved to present issues of law for the Tribunal to decide, which are 
based on the assumption that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. 
This means that we have been able to hold hearings in public, including 
full adversarial argument, as to whether the conduct alleged, if it had 
occurred, would have been lawful. We may then hold ‘closed’ hearings in 
private to apply the legal conclusions from the open hearings to the 
facts.98  
This mixture of open inter partes hearings and then closed hearings on the facts 
may be enough to allow the UK to convincingly argue that the IPT is quite 
distinct from FISC and therefore the UK is compliant with Article 47.  
                                                        
98 http://www.ipt-uk.com/ (visited 1 August 2017). 
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The story doesn’t end there though. Perhaps the key outcome of Schrems was the 
clear statement that “legislation permitting the public authorities to have access 
on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be 
regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for 
private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.”99  Again the UK has until 
now been shielded by its EU membership and in particular its membership of the 
Charter. This time the UK may point to the fact that it remains an ECHR state (at 
least for the foreseeable future) and as a result for Article 7 of the Charter we 
may substitute Article 8 ECHR. However it is clear that the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 contains a number of provisions that apply to EU27 residents and 
citizens in a different manner to “individuals in the British Islands”.100 For 
example if one looks to s.136, Bulk Interception Warrants we are told that they 
may only be issued for “the interception of overseas-related communications” 
and that this is “communications sent by individuals who are outside the British 
Islands, or communications received by individuals who are outside the British 
Islands.” Similar distinctions may be found in s.158 (Bulk Acquisition Warrants) 
and s.176 (Bulk Equipment Interference Warrants).101  
 
Thus EU27 residents (and presumably overwhelmingly citizens) in the UK will 
be treated differently under the Investigatory Powers Act to UK residents (and 
                                                        
99 Above n.66, [94]. 
100 The British Islands is a legal definition of collective landmasses found in Schedule 1 of the 
Interpretation Act 1978. It is “the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.”  
101 A discussion of what qualifies as an “overseas-related communication”, or in the language of 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, an external communication, may be found at 
Liberty & Ors. v GCHQ & Ors. [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H. Available from: http://www.ipt-
uk.com/docs/IPT_13_168-173_H.pdf (visited 1 August 2017).  
 45 
overwhelmingly citizens). This makes the Schrems statement a live issue. There 
are safeguards in place, in each case a warrant must be issued by the Secretary of 
State and must be approved by Judicial Commissioners. It is not therefore 
“retention on a generalised basis” of communications and communications data 
but rather some form of targeted system. At least that’s what the UK Government 
would say. However when we also know that GCHQ were using as few as 
eighteen periodically renewed RIPA s.8(4) warrants to authorise TEMPORA as 
well as their other programmes,102 allowing them to  tap into the transatlantic 
fibre optic cables, which reportedly allowed them to processes 40 billion items of 
data per day: then these safeguards seem more illusory than real. The questions 
therefore become (a) is this “legislation permitting the public authorities to have 
access [to communications and data] on a generalised basis” and (b) will the 
additional safeguards of the Investigatory Powers Act, such as the introduction 
of Judicial Commissioners, protect the UK Government?  
 
VIII: CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence is clearly beginning to mount against the assumption that the UK 
will be able “to secure the unhindered flow of data between the UK and the EU 
post-Brexit” as Mr. Hancock would like. Whether negotiated as part of the Article 
50 settlement, or separately as an adequacy decision, there are clear issues the 
UK Government needs to overcome regarding both data retention and mass 
surveillance. When this is placed against a backdrop of a likely failure of the UK 
domestic settlement to recognise an Article 8 right to Data Protection (as 
                                                        
102 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and 
transparent legal framework, HC 1075, 12 March 2015, fn83. 
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opposed to the operationalization of that right through GDPR style legislation) 
things begin to look bleak.   
 
When one examines the Schrems decision some other issues emerge. The first is 
that even should an adequacy decision be issued, then as Max Schrems did 
himself, EU27 citizens concerned about the UK’s state surveillance and data 
retention programme may challenge the transfer of their data to the UK via any 
EU27 supervisory authority.103 Secondly the duties of the Commission do not 
end with an adequacy decision. As the Court stated in Schrems “in the light of the 
fact that the level of protection ensured by a third country is liable to change, it is 
incumbent upon the Commission, after it has adopted a decision pursuant to 
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46, to check periodically whether the finding 
relating to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured by the third country in 
question is still factually and legally justified. Such a check is required, in any 
event, when evidence gives rise to a doubt in that regard.”104 Further “as the 
Advocate General has stated in points 134 and 135 of his Opinion, when the 
validity of a Commission decision adopted pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 
95/46 is examined, account must also be taken of the circumstances that have 
arisen after that decision’s adoption.”105  
 
Perhaps of most concern for the UK Government going forward is that such a 
review must be strict.106  The possible impact of this is that even if the UK has 
some form of adequacy decision, whether negotiated as part of the Article 50 
                                                        
103 Above n.66, [40-41]. 
104 Ibid, [76].  
105 Ibid, [77]. 
106 Ibid, [78]. 
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settlement, or as a separate Article 45 GDPR ruling, on 29 March 2019 an 
immediate challenge from a civil society group or individual along the lines of 
Schrems or Digital Rights Ireland v Commission107 is quite likely given the UK’s 
extensive framework of data retention and surveillance legislation, some of 
which treats EU27 residents (and thereby mostly citizens), differently to 
residents of the British Islands. It is not impossible that as a result of such a 
challenge, or even just in the fullness of time as details of how GCHQ and SIS/The 
Security Service operate under the Investigatory Powers Bill framework,108 a 
review of any adequacy decision may be reversed applying the strict Schrems 
criteria.  
 
It is clear that the realpolitik of Brexit is that a continued free flow of data 
between the EU27 and the UK is in the interests of all parties due to the 
extensive nature of the digital single market, GCHQ’s vital role in SIGINT 
provision to Europe as a whole and London’s continued, though perhaps 
diminished, role as the world’s leading financial centre.109 This will in all 
likelihood lead to some form of compromise position being reached before 29 
March 2019 that will deliver to the UK the settlement they seek. However this 
paper suggests that it is folly to assume that the UK’s legal framework guarantees 
this settlement merely by the implementation of the GDPR through domestic 
legislation. Further, although the position on 29 March 2019 may be that 
                                                        
107 Case T-670/16, OJ 2016 C 410/26. 
108 On which see Kieren McCarthy, ‘Leaked: The UK's secret blueprint with telcos for mass spying 
on internet, phones – and backdoors. Real-time full-blown snooping with breakable encryption’, 
The Register, 4 May 2017: 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/04/uk_bulk_surveillance_powers_draft  
109 On which see Karen McCullagh, “Brexit: potential trade and data implications for digital and 
‘fintech’ industries”, 7(1) IDPL 3 (2017).   
 48 
agreement on data transfers has been reached, we cannot assume that position 
would remain in effect indefinitely given the responsibility of the Commission to 
“to check periodically whether the finding relating to the adequacy of the level of 
protection ensured by the third country in question is still factually and legally 
justified.”110  
                                                        
110 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, above n.66 at [64].  
